

THE *Nation* January 3, 1942

Betrayal in Washington

Mr. Hull Should Resign - - *Freda Kirchwey*

Aid and Comfort to the Enemy - - *I. F. Stone*

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Don't Plan for Collapse

BY HAROLD STRAUSS

✱

Hitler's Plight in Russia

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

✱

How Australia Built for War

BY HALLETT ABEND

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THE *Nation*

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 154

NEW YORK · SATURDAY · JANUARY 3, 1942

NUMBER 1

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Published weekly and copyright, 1942, in the U. S. A. by The Nation, Inc., 65 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 18, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 856 National Press Building.

Mr. Hull Should Resign

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

DID the President know in advance about the State Department's shocking attack on the Free French forces which liberated the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon from Vichy's dictatorship? If he did, the United States today stands disgraced before freedom-loving men and women everywhere. Already the incredulous surprise with which the news was received in Free French territories, in Latin America, in democratic circles here at home, is beginning to change into anger and bitter cynicism. If the President knew, then the very principle of freedom has been betrayed by its most respected and powerful defender.

But certainly the President did not know. His long toleration of State Department tactics is not to be excused, but at worst it has never gone to the length of permitting an open insult, coupled with a direct threat, to an Allied force engaged in advancing the Allied cause. Of such blundering stupidity the President is incapable. The evidence cited by Mr. Stone indicates that the State Department acted on its own, pursuing with imbecile consistency its fixed policy of yielding to Vichy, snubbing the Free French, and ignoring the contrary advice of Britain. Having guaranteed Martinique to Hitler's French "utensils" it was doubtless as clear as daylight to the State Department's mind that St. Pierre and Miquelon must be restored to Vichy rule—by force if necessary. Perhaps these two strategic islands were sold out in the same deal; the Axis radio is telling the islanders they were. If so, it is all too easy to believe that the State Department issued its pronouncement without consulting anyone—just as part of the day's appeasement. The technique is an old one and has been successful before.

The President could not have known in advance. And so the situation can still be saved by quick, uncompromising action. He can still prove that our brave talk about democracy is not all hokum designed to trap the unwary and mislead the innocent. But he must move fast or it will be too late.

If the State Department, without consultation with the President or the Cabinet, has plunged the nation into its present humiliating position, its officials should be called to account as promptly as were the military leaders at Pearl Harbor. Without the least delay the President should demand the resignation of the officials who on their own say-so betrayed the cause to which this country has been pledged not only by the terms of the Atlantic Charter but in many pronouncements by the President.

After these officials, including the Secretary of State, have duly resigned, the President should institute an investigation to fix responsibility for this unsanctioned act. The inquiry should be broad enough to explore the whole twilight cult of appeasement, of which the repudiation of the Free French at St. Pierre and Miquelon is only the most startling and recent symbol. Throughout the years, in one instance after the other, this policy has proved both its danger and its futility. Why should men who have demonstrated their failure with such undeviating success be permitted to direct the policy of a great power committed to a life-and-death struggle?

Specifically the President should inquire into the immediate antecedents of our moral disaster at St. Pierre and Miquelon. He should find out, first, whether the State Department had in fact promised to hold for Vichy the French possessions in this hemisphere. If such a shameless commitment was made, he should find out quickly what it implied in terms of action. As these words are written hasty consultations are going on behind the closed doors of the State Department where officials are trying to save their guilty faces while at the same time fulfilling their pledges to their dictator-friends at Vichy. Vice Admiral Muselier with the whole population of the islands behind him still stands firm at St. Pierre and Miquelon. And the Canadian government, which clearly was neither surprised nor horrified when the islands came over to the Allied side, is showing no eagerness to do the State Department's dirty work. A compromise may be in the making which will high-light the contradictions of American policy by ousting the Free French and then establishing some sort of Allied control of the St. Pierre radio station to prevent the Vichy officials we shall have restored to power from using the station to give information to Nazi submarines and raiders preying on Allied shipping.

But no compromise will either save the honor of the United States or absolve the President from the necessity of finding out just what Mr. Hull promised Admiral Robert. Did he promise the aid of the American fleet in holding the French islands for Vichy? Or did he, rashly it would seem, offer the services of the Canadian forces? Or did he perhaps tell the General that in case of trouble with unruly pro-Ally subjects he could take the interned French ships out of the harbor at Martinique? These are questions which events may answer. But events have a

way of blotting out past promises and before that happens the President should discover just what commitments Vichy's agents in the State Department made in the name of the United States.

The President can hardly accept the State Department myth that the French fleet is preserved from Hitler's control only by the blackmail paid to Vichy by the United States. The only important check on the Pétain collaborationists—and on Hitler himself—is the spirit of resistance that still exists in the fleet and among the French people, a spirit which the State Department's behavior last week was calculated to damage beyond repair. This is the simple fact and the President knows it. He should know, too, that the behavior of the State Department can no more be passed over than it can be explained away. The episode of the French islands was dismissed as a "teapot tempest" by the New York *Herald Tribune* in its first editorial after the State Department's intervention. But tempests always start in small areas. This one is not subsiding. It is gathering force with every hour; it is sweeping across seas and continents carrying to all adherents of freedom the news that the United States has thrown its tremendous power against self-government and the will of a small group of Frenchmen to join in the fight to end tyranny.

This news is worth many capital ships and many divisions of men to the Axis powers. Who will risk his life President fails to act, the dictators will have gained one democracy sells freedom at so cheap a price? If the for even his own freedom when the world's greatest of the decisive victories of the war.

A Message from St. Pierre

The editors of *The Nation*, shocked by the action of the State Department in protesting against the Free French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, sent the following telegram to Vice-Admiral Emile Muselier:

YOU AND THE FREE FRENCH FORCES AND THE PEOPLE OF ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON HAVE THE UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT OF ALL PATRIOTIC AMERICANS WHO FEEL NOTHING BUT SHAME AT THEIR GOVERNMENT'S BETRAYAL OF OUR COMMON CAUSE. HOLD FAST. DESTINY HAS PUT THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM IN YOUR HANDS AND YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO YIELD OR COMPROMISE.

Vice-Admiral Muselier replied immediately as follows:

THE ADMIRAL-IN-CHIEF COMMANDING THE FREE FRENCH NAVAL FORCES, THE MARINE VOLUNTEERS, THE IMMENSE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION OF ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON THANK YOU WITH ALL THEIR HEARTS FOR YOUR TELEGRAM. I KNEW IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THE NOBLE AMERICAN NATION WOULD NOT BE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH US IN THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY AND IN THE SACRED RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF DETERMINATION. WHATEVER HAPPENS WE WILL HOLD ON UNTIL THE END. FOR ALL DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD ST. PIERRE, LIKE YOUR STATUE OF LIBERTY, IS A SYMBOL.

(Signed) ADMIRAL MUSELIER

The Shape of Things

SUMMING UP THE SERIES OF CONFERENCES with Winston Churchill and other Allied representatives in which he had been constantly engaged for over a week, the President declared: "The present over-all objective is the marshaling of all resources, military and economic, of the world-wide front opposing the Axis. Excellent progress along these lines is being made." We shall probably have to be content with this very general statement for some time, and it would be over-optimistic to expect perfect coordination of all the varied forces now opposing the Axis. But the first essential step is a real will to cooperate, and this seems to have been demonstrated not only in Washington but in Moscow and Chungking. The conference in China's war capital between Chiang Kai-shek, Major-General George H. Brett, Chief of the United States Army Air Corps, and General Wavell, Britain's commander in India, may lead to an important military counter-offensive against Japan. In making their widely dispersed attacks on the fringes of the South China Sea the Japanese have left partially exposed their right flank, which in effect extends from the northern Manchoukuoan border to Bangkok, a distance of some two thousand miles. They cannot find troops to cover such a line adequately, and it ought to be possible for both the Chinese and the British—operating from Burma—to find weak spots to attack. Even if such attacks could not be developed into a real offensive, at least until the supply situation improves, they might well serve to relieve Japanese pressure in other directions.

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AS WINSTON CHURCHILL INDICATED IN HIS masterly address before Congress, lack of war material of all kinds is likely to handicap the anti-Axis front for at least another twelve months. Now that the United States is in the war, the potential resources of the Allies are greatly superior to those of the totalitarian powers, but that potential has yet to be translated into actual planes, tanks, and guns ready for action. Eventually we may achieve an overwhelming abundance, but until we do the problem of distributing limited supplies between a number of competing theaters of war will involve many ticklish decisions. Both Britain and Russia seem to have feared that America might become so absorbed in the Pacific war that the urgent needs of the European fronts might be overlooked. London and Moscow agree in viewing Hitler's Germany as the cornerstone of the Axis conspiracy and the primary objective of Allied strategy. The British delegation in Washington has apparently been reassured at finding there substantial apprecia-

tion of this undoubtedly valid perspective. This does not mean, however, that the Pacific can be safely neglected. We may be able to afford to wait for the final counter-blow against Japan until Germany is definitely headed toward collapse, but we must buttress the defenses of the East Indies against the Japanese offensive or risk a long lag in our supply time-table. A Washington dispatch in the *New York Times* reports that Mr. Churchill "is apparently satisfied that Singapore can hold out, even if it gets very little more help, for at least nine months." On the basis of the present known facts this forecast, if it really does represent the Premier's views, seems to us more than a little optimistic.

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IN AUSTRALIA OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL statements suggest considerable anxiety lest the Pacific arena be neglected in favor of other fronts. That large but sparsely inhabited dominion has from the beginning contributed heavily to Britain's war effort, as an article by Hallett Abend on page 12 shows. It has been moved to do so not merely by sentiment but by an intelligent anticipation that Axis triumphs in Europe would eventually lead to Japanese aggression in the Pacific. But now that aggression has come, Australia is more keenly aware of its vulnerability to invasion should Japan break through the Singapore barrier than of the indivisibility of the world battle. The unimpressive showing of the British imperial forces in Malaya has evoked sharp criticisms. Sir Keith Murdoch, influential publisher of the *Melbourne Herald*, has written a dispatch from London accusing Mr. Churchill of being too "Atlantic-minded" and urging greater participation by the dominions in the formation of war policy. The Australian Premier, John Curtin, has indicated the uneasiness of his country even more plainly in an article written for the same paper. "I make it clear," he writes, "that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs about our traditional links of friendship to Britain. We refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle is a subordinate segment of the general conflict. The government regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia should have the fullest say in the direction of the fighting plan." The sharp tone of this statement makes manifest an anxiety with which it is easy to sympathize. But the parochial outlook which it betrays illustrates once again the necessity for the broadest possible war strategy.

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CUTS OF \$1,717,000,000 IN NON-DEFENSE government expenditures have been recommended to Congress by the joint committee headed by Senator Byrd. As might be expected of any committee headed by the Virginia Senator, the cuts it proposes would affect

chiefly the more progressive of the government's social services. The committee would abolish the Farm Security Administration, the Farm Tenant Program, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the peace-time activities of the National Youth Administration; it would greatly curtail the Works Progress Administration. Some of these cuts are, of course, justified. The army will absorb a large part of the personnel and at least part of the functions of the CCC and NYA. It is fair to assume that unemployment will be reduced drastically as the arms program is expanded. Agricultural conditions have already improved substantially. But although some reduction in social-service outlays can be defended on the ground of the changed situation and the necessity for holding public expenditures to a minimum in order to check inflation, the outright abolition of no one of these agencies can be defended. The farm-tenant problem, for example, is a permanent one which can only be dealt with by long-range social planning, and youth requires suitable training in war time fully as much as in peace. Savings must be made, but we suspect that more can be saved by cutting the dead wood out of the regular departments than by depriving tenant farmers and underprivileged young men and women of hope for a decent living.

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THE BLASTS THAT SHOOK PEARL HARBOR scared most of our native fascists back into the wall. Most, but not all. The Coughlin species is still scurrying about, and while its activities are less noisy than hitherto, they are if possible more virulent. *Social Justice* gives its readers the considered opinion that Japan's surprise raid represented "only a fair job in copying the 'sneak' tactics of Great Britain." A better imitation would have involved first signing "an alliance with Uncle Sam at least." No hint that the gang that blitzed a dozen countries of Europe might have been the model. But, then, Germany, Italy, and Japan are still presented to the Father's flock as the "have-nots" in a war "against the have-nations" precipitated by "the bungling diplomats and politicians . . . here and abroad." In any case, the main task now is not the banishing of Hitlerism, but "liquidating the causes" of Hitlerism, namely, Marxism, Leninism, the Rothschilds, the Bank of England, and "the pack of usurers who transubstantiated a vice into a virtue in the sixteenth century." That is the public line. In the privacy of the United States mails anything goes. In thousands of letters mailed on December 19 Francis P. Moran, director of the Christian Front of America, found President Roosevelt "guilty of murder." By refusing "to grant to the Orient the same right of self-determination that we ourselves have demanded in our Monroe Doctrine" the President provoked Japan into making war when it would otherwise "have had no incentive to attack us."

Reverses in the Pacific

THE news from the Far East continues to be bad. Wake Island, Hongkong, and Sarawak in northern Borneo were Christmas presents from the Japanese army to the Emperor. Further advances have been made against Singapore. American and Filipino troops continue to be forced back in the Philippines. Manila, though declared an open city, has been subjected to devastating raids.

There is a tendency in many quarters to dismiss these early reverses as inevitable. Many commentators are stressing the fact that the American and British outposts in the Pacific are difficult to defend because they are so much closer to the main Japanese bases than to ours or those of Great Britain. They point out that the war is not likely to be settled by the conquest of a few islands in the early weeks of the struggle and that in the long run our superior resources should give us an immense advantage. Statements such as these, while undeniably true, savor of the defensive psychology which has sapped the vitality of the democracies throughout the world in the past few years. There was nothing "inevitable" about the Japanese victories in the Far East. The Japanese won at Pearl Harbor because they had made careful plans for the maximum use of their inferior resources—and because the American military and naval authorities were admittedly asleep. They took Wake, despite a gallant defense by a handful of American marines, partly because Congress had failed to fortify it, partly because the navy was not prepared quickly to reinforce its garrison. Their successes in the Philippines may be attributed to our failure to provide underground shelters for our few fighter and bomber planes. For months the American public has been lulled into a feeling of false security by reports of the dispatch of large numbers of long-distance bombers and fighters to the Philippines, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. It now appears that very few planes were sent, and inadequate plans were made for the protection of those that were.

It should go without saying that no satisfying appraisal of American strategy is possible at this stage. Many factors, such as the disposition of our fleet, the dispatch of reinforcements, and plans for repairing air losses, are military secrets. The fact that the main battle fleet of the navy is unreported does not mean that it is idle. But we do know that the brave defenders of Wake were not relieved in a siege lasting more than a fortnight although the island is closer to Honolulu than to Tokyo. And while we have been at war for more than three weeks, there have been no reports of American reinforcements reaching either the Philippines or Singapore. Reinforcing these outposts undoubtedly involves great difficulties, but if adequate plans had been laid in advance, some assistance could have reached the beleaguered areas from

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Hawaii, if not from the mainland, by this time. So far the only reinforcements known to have reached their destination were landed at Hawaii. Such a diversion of our energies was undoubtedly one of the major strategic objectives of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

All of this fits in with the belief which was generally held by our military leaders a few years ago—that the Philippines could not be defended in a war with Japan. This belief was based, however, on the situation to be expected in a war which involved only the United States and Japan. It did not take into account Singapore or the existence of hostilities between China and Japan. Under present conditions the Philippines are virtually indispensable to the Allied defenses in the Pacific. A sustained, large-scale attack on Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, which if successful would probably prolong the war for many years, cannot succeed as long as American submarines and American bombers have the use of bases on Luzon. Moreover, the possession of Singapore and the Dutch naval bases—to say nothing of continued Chinese resistance—greatly facilitates the task of defending the islands.

Our troops have fought magnificently, and there is reason to believe that General MacArthur can hold out if he is given planes, tanks, and even a moderate number of reinforcements. Whether this assistance will arrive in time, only the staff officers in Washington can say. But to date our military leadership contrasts sadly with the competence and heroism shown by our men in the field.

The No-Strike Agreement

THE President cut short the Industry-Labor Conference, which was threatening to drag on interminably, by accepting the three-point formula on which agreement had been reached: no strikes or lockouts, settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, institution by the President of a War Labor Board to handle disputes. By this move Mr. Roosevelt quietly relegated the problem of the closed shop to the status of an arbitrable issue. Having agreed to abide by the President's decision, the management group at the conference had to accept the formula, but it made no secret of its disappointment and annoyance at the absence of any provision for placing the closed-shop question in cold storage for the duration of the war.

The employers' arguments on this point have naturally been picked up and developed by the conservative press. Thus the *New York Times* tells the government that it must immediately "declare, as the War Labor Board did in 1917, that any demand from either side for a change in the status of a closed or open shop shall not be considered a proper grievance for submission to a war labor board or to arbitration. This is the only possi-

ble basis for maintaining industrial peace on this issue during the war." To us, on the contrary, such action would seem a sure way to undermine the industrial truce by destroying its spirit. The trade unions, although far more strongly organized than in 1917, have surrendered their weapon of last resort and agreed to submit all disputes which prove unamenable to settlement by negotiation to the decision of an arbitration board. Are they now to be told that, on demand of the other party, a whole class of disputes about which they feel deeply is to be ruled out of court altogether?

The analogy with the position in 1917 is far from perfect. Then, as a correspondent of the *Times* has pointed out, organized labor was weak, and the principle of collective bargaining had not won general recognition. The War Labor Board ruled that employers had to accept this principle, and in return for this tremendous gain organized labor could afford to forgo demands for the closed shop. Today the freezing of this issue would mean a one-sided concession by labor with no corresponding sacrifice by the employers, who have no expectation of eliminating the closed shop where it is already in operation. More than that, it would open the way to an actual deterioration in labor's bargaining position.

Let us consider the position in a large industrial plant now 90 per cent union organized and ripe for a closed-shop contract. War orders lead to a 100 per cent expansion in the working force, and many of the recruits, attracted from non-industrial pursuits, fail to see the connection between the good wages they enjoy and the previous efforts of the union. At the end of the war, if the union had managed to hold its original membership, it would have only 50 per cent of the total employees, and the management would be in a fine position not merely to resist any demand for a closed shop but perhaps to break the union altogether.

The question whether the closed shop has any place in a democracy is a debatable one, and so is the question of the private ownership of natural monopolies. But both these institutions have been accepted in certain industries for many years and have legal status. If the extension of the former is to be limited by administrative fiat or legislation, are the proponents of this step willing to have their arguments applied to the case of the latter, which is very similar in principle? We doubt it.

There have been suggestions both in the press and in Congressional circles that industry should be given its way in the matter of the closed shop by a revival of the Smith bill or some similar measure. We hope our legislators are awake to the reckless folly of this proposal. Labor has responded magnificently to the national danger and is showing in a hundred ways that it intends to "remember Pearl Harbor." Nothing would so much disturb morale as the insistence on punitive legislation by Congressmen unable to forget John L. Lewis.

Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, December 28

SO FAR as I can learn, the liberation of St. Pierre and Miquelon from Vichy rule by Free French forces was carried out with the knowledge and consent, if not the cooperation, of the British and Canadian governments. Vice-Admiral Emile Muselier spent several weeks on Canadian soil preparing for the occupation. In both London and Ottawa it was felt that the islands, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, were too important to the defense of the Dominion and the security of transatlantic trade routes to be left to the mercy of our State Department's incorrigible determination to play pat-a-cake with Vichy. The State Department did not consult Ottawa and London before making its agreement to protect Vichy control in Martinique, and Ottawa and London did not consult the State Department before permitting the Free French to restore free government and an anti-Axis regime in St. Pierre and Miquelon. The Free French did not consult the State Department because the State Department had not consulted the Free French, whom it still does not recognize. And it was well understood all around that the State Department, if consulted, would have objected because it does not intend to stop trying to appease Pétain until that aged puppet has outgrown his usefulness to Hitler and the Nazis take over France.

When news of the occupation reached the State Department, it instructed Ambassador Winant to file a protest with the British Foreign Office. Winant, who is no appeaser, assumed that the White House had approved the idea and made the protest. In Washington Samuel Reber, the State Department official in charge of French affairs and an appeaser from way back, went in person to protest at the British embassy. He was told that the British knew nothing about the occupation and didn't intend to do anything about it. In the meantime the Foreign Office, through Malcolm MacDonald, jumped the traces of protocol and reached Beaverbrook at the White House. The word which went back to London, after Beaverbrook had inquired, was that the State Department had ordered the protest without first clearing the matter at the White House. The British were informed that the President called in Hull and took the Secretary of State down a peg. Their feeling was that the State Department would be forced to back down on this matter. I am not so sure.

Whatever the outcome, the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair serves notice on the world that the American State De-

partment is now the last stronghold of appeasement. It must also give the impression that our foreign policy is being run in the halfwit fashion that led so many of the Western democracies cheerfully to their doom. On November 24 the Free French delegation in New York released a letter written by the President on November 11 to Lease-Lend Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., declaring the defense of any Free French territory "vital to the defense of the United States." The invocation of that statutory formula placed lease-lend aid at the disposal of the Free French, and they opened an office in Washington to make arrangements for obtaining materials of war. On December 8, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Free French National Committee in London declared war on Japan. This was no empty gesture. In New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and Tahiti the Free French control South Pacific islands that are now our only remaining stepping-stones to the Far East. Had we backed the Free French, they might have made French Indo-China our base against Japan, instead of leaving it to become Vichy's gift to Japan as a base against the Philippines and Thailand. The Free French are our allies. Vichy is the tool of our enemies. Yet on Christmas Day Cordell Hull, with a stupidity that calls for his removal from office, had the State Department issue a statement sneering at the "so-called Free French navy" and demanding restoration of St. Pierre and Miquelon to Vichy.

I have spent most of the day talking with representatives of the Free French, and I want to report that the Secretary of State's reference rankles. The State Department could not have chosen a better way to undermine the confidence of oppressed peoples everywhere than by its slur, and I think some way should be found to let the world know in decisive fashion that the undemocratic little clique of decayed pseudo-aristocrats and backsliding liberals who dominate the State Department do not speak for the American people. The people of St. Pierre and Miquelon have been dismissing Axis radio reports that we would force return of the islands to Vichy as typical Nazi lies. But to our own "Propaganda Ministry," Colonel Donovan's office for the coordination of information, has fallen the unhappy task of broadcasting to the French people and the French colonies in the past few days the fact that the democratic United States stands squarely behind the traitors who are Hitler's tools in France. How Donovan's division can hope to make effective pro-democratic propaganda in Europe after those broadcasts is a

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question the White House had better ponder. In North Africa native leaders have already been saying to the Free French, "Why should we take a chance on supporting you when the United States supports Vichy?"

The usual State Department secrecy surrounds this affair, but in the murk one can make out a few main figures. At the top is Cordell Hull with his capacity for yielding one democratic position after another behind the smoke screen of nebulous moral homilies. Too many young lives are at stake for us to be tender any longer with a Secretary of State who favored the sale to Japan of the oil and scrap iron which made possible the bombardment of Manila he now deplors. Lower down, in the bowels of the bureaucracy, is a figure like Reber, in charge of French affairs at the department. Reber received his training at our embassy in Rome under Breckinridge Long and William Phillips, socialite diplomats with strong leanings toward fascism. The rationalizations put forward for our attempts to appease Vichy are much the same as those that Long, Phillips, and Reber propounded for supplying Il Duce with scrap iron and oil for six months after the war began. Behind these figures

and their picayune and transparent Machiavellianisms lie forces unsympathetic to democracy and uncomfortable when confronted with popular aspiration. There is also a dangerous under-cover animosity toward the British. In the picture, too, is the State Department's fondness for the Vatican and the Vatican's fondness for Vichy, and the Vatican's old hatred—a hatred it shares with the Fascists—for 1789. The atmosphere is one in which it is much easier to figure out reasons for further appeasement than for forthright and democratic action.

It may be that we must suffer some great and resounding defeat before we cleanse the State Department of the undemocratic bureaucracy which runs it, before we recognize that we cannot hope to muster the peoples of the world in a democratic crusade as long as our foreign policy is in the hands of men whose talk of democracy is made a sham by their actions. If the State Department proves strong enough—to our eternal shame—to force the return of St. Pierre and Miquelon to Vichy, perhaps this betrayal of democracy may at least wake us up enough to force a return of the control of our foreign policy to men more representative of the American people.

Hitler's Plight in Russia

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

THE most important news of the war at present comes from Russia. American and British losses in the Far East in the early stages of a Pacific war were written off in advance by all the experts. In view of British control of the Mediterranean and the large extent of American aid in the Near East, Axis defeats in the struggle for Libya were probable. But the German setbacks in Russia were definitely not foreseen, either by the Germans themselves or by the majority of neutral observers.

When in June, 1941, Hitler made one of his usual treacherous attacks, this time upon the Soviet Union, few observers believed the Russians had much chance of a successful resistance. The unwillingness of Soviet leaders to boast of their military progress to the outside world, plus the sorry showing made by half-trained reservists in the Finnish war, had led most military experts to rate Red Army troops rather low. During the first few months of the war, when the Germans, profiting by the impetus of their surprise attack, won smashing victories in the Battle of the Frontiers, general expectations seemed on their way to realization.

But the Russians failed to behave like Hitler's previous victims. They fought with more than mere courage. They were well-equipped for the newer type of war, and

they resisted with an imaginative intelligence and utter disregard for life new in Nazi experience. Troops that were outmaneuvered and surrounded did not recognize their hopeless tactical position and surrender, but fought until all were killed, thereby inflicting heavy losses on the Germans, or else broke up into guerrilla bands and played havoc with transportation and communication. Retreating troops and civilians destroyed everything of value, planted thousands of land mines, poisoned wells and streams, and attempted to make all German advance profitless. Russian casualties were obviously enormous, but so were those of the Germans; and Russia had 180,000,000 to draw from as against 80,000,000 Germans. The Nazi communiqués, which in earlier campaigns had been models of terse accuracy, became more and more vague and imaginative. The Russian air force was repeatedly destroyed in communiqués, but in actual warfare seemed to possess the lives of a cat.

As the fall months passed, the Germans made immense gains of ground. The Baltic coast was taken, and besieging armies pressed close on Leningrad. On the central front the Reichswehr gained steadily. Disaster overtook the Russians in the Ukraine as Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, and finally Rostov were reduced. The rich iron-mining region of Krivoy Rog, the valuable hydroelectric

plants on the Dnieper, and at last the very heart of Russian industry in the Donetz Basin fell into enemy hands. But these captures netted the Germans surprisingly little immediate gain, since the "scorched earth" policy of the Chinese was applied successfully in a new sphere and the Russians repaired their huge losses from a seemingly endless supply of fresh men and material. Meanwhile the cardinal objective of German strategy, destruction of the Russian field armies, remained unachieved. A last great offensive before Moscow on the central front failed amid intense cold.

No sector of the war has been so consistently hard to analyze as the eastern front, for in no other area of combat are the unknown factors so numerous and important. The Russians have refused to allow even their allies to know what was actually taking place. Hence many persons have been puzzled by the recent German retreat, and some newspapermen have even accepted at face value the Germans' assurance that their retirement was a strategic one, made for the purpose of shortening their lines. This explanation has now lost all validity. Even if the forced retirement of high officers of the German army and Hitler's assumption of personal command did not signify a situation well out of hand, the uneasy tone of Goebbels's releases and his assurances that the war will be long and hard would do so. The German retreat has been accompanied by large losses of both men and material. For days at a time the *Luftwaffe* has been relatively inactive, leaving to the Russians the command of the air. Only out of dire necessity would the brilliant German High Command engage in so costly a "strategic retreat."

On the basis of known facts and reasonable deductions from those facts three explanations present themselves. In the first place, German lines of communication have become long and difficult beyond any previously known in modern war. All kinds of supplies have to come from Germany, for the Russians have destroyed everything they could. Russian railroads, even in the few cases where they have not been demolished, are valueless because of the difference in gauge. The construction of transportation lines is in itself a task requiring the services of hundreds of thousands of men. And their protection against swarms of saboteurs and guerrillas operating behind the German lines is all but impossible. This constant drain on men and material, increasing with distance, has taken much of the snap and punch out of German offensives.

Much more important is the fact that German troops are obviously in poor condition. They are less used to sub-zero weather than their Russian opponents and, thanks partly to the British blockade, are less well equipped for it. The Russians have shelters and facilities for recreation back of their lines, while the Germans would need weeks of uninterrupted effort back of stable

lines to construct any that would be adequate. Constant campaigning has left the German troops physically exhausted. Sanitation under the circumstances is obviously difficult, and typhus, which preys on lice-covered, run-down soldiers, has already made its appearance. Such conditions have a bad effect, and the morale of even the hardened Germans is probably a matter of serious concern to the army leaders. In brief, the traditional defenses of Russia—severe winters and interminable distances—are actively aiding the Red Army.

Finally, Germany may very possibly be feeling a severe pinch in raw materials, especially in oil. An article by C. L. Sulzberger that appeared in the *New York Times* early in December cited Russian reasons for believing that the German oil supply was being expended faster than it could be replaced, and that Hitler at the time had reserves sufficient for only three to four months of extremely active conflict. While it is unsafe to assume that Germany has reached the point of economic exhaustion, the recent declines in submarine sinkings, the comparative inactivity of the *Luftwaffe*, and the enormous number of vehicles captured with engines worn out from using low-grade oils may indicate that Germany is nearing the bottom of its oil barrel.

Obviously Hitler, as personal commander of the German armies, is now on the spot. He must either deliver or be discredited. If the Germans are extremely short of raw materials, an offensive under present weather conditions might well spell their complete exhaustion before the Caucasian oil wells could be reached and utilized. With intense unrest and in some cases active rebellion in the remainder of Europe, it would probably be unsafe to reduce German garrisons in order to strengthen weakened lines in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile difficulties of transport and climate will continue to be grave.

On the other hand, the obvious face-saving expedient of withdrawing to easily held lines and starting a campaign elsewhere offers no easy solution. The plains of Eastern Europe are singularly flat and devoid of natural obstacles. In so vast a theater warfare must be active rather than passive, and any fixed position is subject to being outflanked and rendered worthless. If, as is implied, the Germans are seeking better positions, they will have a long retreat over hard-won ground before they find any relatively secure line of defense.

Further, Hitler would encounter stiff opposition anywhere except on a push through Spain and Portugal. The British position in the Near East, last summer so weak that a German attack through Turkey would certainly have succeeded, is now very much stronger. With Russia on his hands it is open to question whether Hitler could spare enough troops to achieve victory in the Near East—especially in view of the added transportation troubles such an effort would entail.

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Don't Plan for Collapse

BY HAROLD STRAUSS

A GREAT deal of hokum is being talked about the inevitability of a post-war economic collapse. If the Cassandras were merely wrong, their indictment could be left to time. If they were merely prodding us to constructive action, their excessive zeal could be accepted. But actually they are fostering an almost pathological fear of the future which is inhibiting every useful effort to make that future a better one. We not only approach post-war problems in a mood of helpless resignation, but we allow ourselves to be heavily hampered in the war effort itself.

Pessimism about the future fires the determination of pressure groups to "get theirs" now. It makes industry refuse to expand. It drives labor to press its advantage. It causes forward-looking programs such as the Wagner-Voorhis resolution for the establishment of an anti-slump economic general staff to languish in committee. It undermines the work of determined expansionists like Leon Henderson. It was, according to *Life*, the common pretext for isolationism in the Middle West. It nourishes the plans of the corporate money managers for a severe deflation. It sidetracked the Reuther plan and vitiates the subcontracting program.

A few farsighted men have already denounced the inhibiting effect of our fear of the future. Sidney Blumenthal, chairman of a large textile concern, has said:

We encounter apprehension everywhere as to the collapse when defense activity may be sharply curtailed. That fear drags on our utmost effort. That fear can be largely reduced once we convince the nation of its responsibility to continue large-scale production after the termination of the war. . . . As a part of our defense effort now, therefore, we need a plan for shifting over the full measure of our productive forces to peace-time needs.

And James B. Carey, secretary of the C. I. O., has made the statesman-like proposal that "we must lay down a guaranty of post-war production levels, assuring full employment and maximum use of facilities, to remove the chief fear blocking the present defense effort—fear of the future."

I suggest that with a moderate degree of sound planning, with more vigorous progressive leadership, and above all with general determination to make the avoidance of a post-war collapse an objective second only to winning the war, our fear of the future can be proved empty. Leon Henderson on several occasions has referred not only to the adverse effects of pessimism but to its

groundlessness. On July 15 he delivered an address before the New York Housewares Manufacturers' Association in which a stirring vision of what Americans can make of their future glowed between the lines. The *New York Times* reported:

Mr. Henderson expressed a belief that the expansion of over-all production caused by the defense program did not entail as great a danger of overexpansion as many business men thought.

"There has been far too much concern within industry over the dangers of expansion, too much willingness to accept shortages of raw materials, of plant capacity, of power and freight cars as an inevitable concomitant of all-out production in this country," he said. "We have been too prone to think of vested interests, of friends in industry who might be embarrassed when the emergency is over by more plant capacity than it was thought could be used on the basis of past experience. Literally interpreted, this philosophy means that its proponents believe the country is done. . . . It assumes that because we have had unemployment in the past we can never achieve and maintain something approaching full employment. That philosophy is false, and will be proved so in the future. This armament program is going to teach the people one thing—that it is possible to have jobs, to earn high wages, to produce goods if the demand is there."

Mr. Henderson sees that the present demand has not come from the market-place but from an aroused community which insists on the production of certain kinds of goods regardless of profit and marketability. His statement is part of the modern revolt against purely financial control of production, and expresses the constructive belief that men, materials, and machines are assets that need only be organized in productive units in an orderly and balanced fashion to enhance the real wealth of the community. The *London Economist* made the same point in different words:

The world is showing an unmistakable tendency to argue that if a thing is physically possible, whether it be fighting a war or removing unemployment, it must not be stopped by considerations of "sound finance" alone. In war, finance is manifestly a mere camp-follower, and the tendency is to reduce it to a dependent status in peace as well.

That this is not understood indicates a failure of progressive thought and progressive leadership. The greatest contribution to the immediate war effort that progressives could make would be a declaration that, come hell

or high water, we will keep the workers in the factories and the farmers in the fields, producing the things that the world will never cease to need. It is useless to expect such a declaration to come from the conservative proponents of scarcity. And it has not yet come from progressives because progressive opinion today is factionalized and fragmented. Individual progressives are to be found in odd corners, grinding their private axes and nursing their private wounds. They content themselves with the consideration of symptoms and labor over the problems of the past—wages, hours, and the closed shop. One has only to go to almost any trade-union meeting to hear all the old slogans mouthed meaninglessly in a new context. Enlightened labor unions would not concern themselves with how little they can work *now*, or with how they can enlarge their share of the national income *now*. Instead, they would use their powerful strategic position to exact post-war maintenance of production, plant conversion, and retraining guaranties. Trade unions might thus become the practical apostles of full production and regain the social leadership they have forfeited to the dollar-a-year men by their regressive policies.

LEGISLATION AGAINST FEAR

Politically the focal point of progressive effort should be the joint resolution introduced by Senator Wagner on January 9, 1941, calling for the establishment of a post-emergency economic advisory commission and a national unemployment commission. Senator Wagner's concern with the continued production of the things we shall never cease to need was indicated when he said: "Most emphatically I do not have in mind merely another relief program on a gigantic scale. What I look forward to is a fully efficient and vigorous system of free enterprise moving progressively toward higher standards of life for ever-widening groups of people." The *Wall Street Journal*, sensing an attack on the artificially induced scarcities so dear to bankers, first tried to identify Wagner's program with "the familiar stop-gap spending programs of the past"; then, forced to back-track, it suggested that the resolution was a measure "to forestall other investigations of the defense program." The progressives gave the resolution a shockingly apathetic reception. Only Richard L. Strout of the quasi-progressive *Christian Science Monitor* grasped its importance. In a front-page article published a few days later he stressed the close connection of Emergency Number One with Emergency Number Two, as he called the prospective post-war collapse, and showed why we must address some part of our attention to the second in the very midst of the first. For the shape of the post-war emergency is determined by our present decisions, and our war drive is hampered by fears of future collapse.

Every organization with a war job to do—and that includes government, industry, and labor—has to solve

unprecedented financial and labor problems. Every procurement order signed, every tax bill passed, every agreement reached by collective bargaining involves fundamental assumptions concerning economic rights, duties, and privileges. These assumptions are valid only if they fit into a broad vision of the kind of world in which we, the people of America, wish to live. Pleas for the maintenance of the status quo are merely evasive; physical change must be met with institutional change. This is not to press opportunism upon labor; labor has come of age and must accept new responsibilities along with new privileges. Nor can we derive easy formulas from the solutions of the past. The past offers, for instance, no ethical grounds for determining a just entrepreneur's wage for a no-risk-taking capitalist who operates a munitions plant financed by the government. The past offers no simple rule for a fair adjustment of wage rates to rising living costs. The past cannot tell us how the power inherent in the union shop will be used by labor in war and peace. In the long run these are moral questions, having to do with the way we want to live together and the way we want to reward specific services to the community. And the value of various services to the community is constantly changing. To deny this is to create parasitic groups of rentiers and pensioners.

Although such questions call for long-range judgments, we are obliged to phrase tentative answers every day. The present and the future, the parts and the whole, the individual and the group, the group and society are separable only in the inner sanctum of the mind—as the French now know only too well. What part of the defense program is to be financed by taxation as against borrowing? To what extent shall we stimulate marginal factors of production by allowing price increases, as against commandeering factories and mines? The answers to such questions have little to do directly with national defense; they might make little difference in net arms output during the war. But they will determine the kind of society in which we shall live after the war. With the best will in the world we cannot, even temporarily, put social controversy on ice. Indeed, in time of war there is an acceleration of institutional change impossible in time of peace; the changes effected now will be conserved by the relative inertia of peace. That is how the shape of the future emergency is being determined now.

The only just reason for pessimism is our failure to address ourselves seriously to the problem of the future. You cannot arouse the élan that accomplishes miracles by telling people that they cannot do business with Hitler. The very word defense was an evasion and a political expedient. We now shall hear it no more. It was in essence a conservative concept; it implied defense of the status quo. And it was natural that conservatives should lead a conservative movement. The dollar-a-year men have not wormed their way into Wash-

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ington or been smuggled there as a part of Roosevelt's betrayal of labor, as John L. Lewis would have it; they have ridden in on the flood tide of conservatism. The conservatives have used their advantage to sell the country the idea of a fearsome post-war collapse. I do not deny that this is a possibility, but to shape our policies upon the certainty of its advent is absolute folly. It is allowing the shape of our present emergency to be determined by fear of the coming one. I said above that net arms output might not be affected by the financial and labor policies adopted, but in practice it is often the threat or the promise of such policies that arouses the determination of pressure groups to "get theirs now."

Financial policy is now being dictated by business, which is instinctively reactionary in its philosophy and unable to think in terms bigger than itself. The crisis is being met by the world's most timorous men. Already much has been done to make the banker's dream world come true after the war, more than we can readily undo. And even if we can rectify conditions in the future, we can never undo the harm already done to our war effort—the present lack of aluminum, of power, of steel, and of a hundred other things, lacks that are the direct result of conservative policy and of the acceptance of a post-war collapse as inevitable. The conservatives know that hitherto they have prospered most under conditions of the greatest scarcity, and act accordingly. It is not too much to say that they are *planning* a post-war collapse. The consequences of dollar-a-year control are the increased cost of defense, retarded production, and deliberate planning for deflation.

HC. 7 BUSINESS HAS BEEN BRIBED

Not much is being said about the costs of defense. Actually, they have soared scandalously. Though the public has been trained to look for war profiteers, by and large it has failed to find them because with the connivance of federal statutes the profits are concealed. Business obtained this connivance by insisting upon the inevitability of post-war collapse and the dangers of plant expansion. The business man admits that he is making a fair profit now but argues that he cannot have his profits taxed because he must accumulate liquid resources against the evil day. He has seized the initiative politically, though in his financial dealings he has found that reluctance and timidity pay; the greater the reluctance, the bigger the bribe. Business has expanded, but at a price so vast and so concealed that it can only be called bribery.

The first bribe was the five-year plant-amortization clause, which for tax purposes allows defense industries to charge 20 per cent of the cost of certified new plant construction each year to operating costs. It was originally intended that the 20 per cent amortization should be allowed only in tax returns and not in cost accounting

under cost-plus-fixed-fee defense contracts (the commonest sort). For a while the Treasury tried to enforce this by insisting that certification for special amortization privileges be withheld until applicants proved that they were not "otherwise reimbursed." Now all Treasury control over certification has been removed, under the guileful plea of speed. The result is that the five-year-amortization clause offers much more than a tax remission; it allows business to eat its cake and have it too—to use up its factories, as far as tax liability is concerned, and still keep them running. For of course the paper rate of depreciation allowed by a benevolent government does not make the factories themselves wear out any quicker. Furthermore, it is not generally understood that since amortization charges are accrued in the form of cash reserves over a period of time, and since technological improvement is continuous, the amortization of a past investment usually provides funds for a much greater future investment in terms of productive capacity. This was fully developed in a TNEC investigation which showed why most great corporations no longer have to seek new money for expansion. What was not brought out by the TNEC was that the value of all cash reserves would show a staggering increase should prices fall drastically in a period of deflation. That is a major reason why business is planning for a collapse. It is possible for a corporation to have built a new plant in 1940; to have the cash that it cost returned by 1945, quite apart from profits and immune from taxes; to have the use of this plant for the remainder of its physical life, possibly fifteen or more years; to have the means of building a new and far more efficient plant; and, if costs have dropped after the war, to have a fat cash balance in hand. Thus a corporation may come out of the war with two or three times the productive capacity of its 1940 investment without having made any further investment.

The second bribe has come from the Defense Plant Corporation, which in various ways relieves reluctant business men of responsibilities. It seems obvious that the community should exact some major compensation for eliminating risk from enterprise, for it has thereby countered the traditional moral claim of business to a profit. It is not possible to calculate just how big a bribe is inherent in the Defense Plant scheme, for the final disposition of the factories built under it has not yet been settled. It is possible, however, that a future Administration favorable to business may donate or virtually donate the plants to the leasing corporations, under the smoke screen of some slogan about a return to "normalcy." The plants have cost the corporations nothing.

The third bribe is the ridiculous excess-profits tax, in both its 1940 and 1941 versions, under which defense industries, such as aircraft, steel, copper, and transportation, reap bonanzas over and above an indubitably large tax bill, while consumers'-goods and service industries,

such as tobacco, merchandising, food, and utilities, pay the piper.

These are the new bribes, but there are also some of long standing. There are the scandalous depletion allowances of extractive industries. And there are the loopholes which allow corporations to conceal profits, a tendency so marked that the TNEC's Monograph XII on "Profits, Productive Activities, and New Investment" takes into statistical account what it politely calls "understatement of profits." It is interesting to speculate on the savings, in dollars and cents, which might have been the fruit of a vigorous and articulate progressive approach to long-range economic problems. Meanwhile the community, having let itself be persuaded that business needs protection against the perils of an "inevitable" collapse, is paying the price.

The increased cost of defense is only one result of the planned timorousness of dollar-a-year control; the second, the refusal of both big business and labor—as in the widespread enforcement of "featherbed" working rules—to expand production, is too familiar to need discussion. Regarding the third consequence, planned post-war collapse, it is clear that the motives are present, for the owners of hoarded cash have a vested interest in deflation, which will give their cash greater purchasing power. It is important to remember that going businesses are accumulating hoards of untaxed dollars in the guise of reserves of all kinds. These reserves are immediate deflationary offsets to government spending, a factor too little considered by those who are alarmed about inflation. Only recently Ganson Purcell of the SEC gave his official blessing to the intensive retirement of out-

standing debt, out of fear of the terrible future. It is clear that all groups—business, labor, and government—are preparing to place a perversely high valuation on money as against goods. This invariably results in an accumulation of cash or bank deposits, the complete breakdown of new investment, a fall in prices, progressive unemployment, and all the other oppressive manifestations summed up in the phrase "idle men, idle money, idle machines."

After Emergency Number One has passed, business will be able to decrease production rapidly and once more effectively simulate scarcity. Provided its reserves are adequate, business can contemplate with satisfaction a period of low production, low prices, and *low costs*. Even the traditional penalty that has hitherto been exacted from business, inventory depreciation, has been greatly mitigated by the new practice of "last in, first out" accounting. Capital is able to provide for the lean years ahead, but labor eats up most of its income every day. Labor has a stake in full production, in an economy of abundance. It is labor, then, which must challenge the defeatism, the unimaginativeness, the conservatism of capital. Our job is to understand just what are the mechanisms whereby we are moving toward full production in war time, and to seek the means of carrying these mechanisms over into peace. Only in this fashion can we give substance to our determination to keep the workers in the factories and the farmers in the fields, and to lay the specter of fear.

[In a second article Mr. Strauss will discuss how the mechanisms of full war production can be redirected to meet the needs of peace.]

How Australia Built for War

BY HALLETT ABEND

AUSTRALIA'S strength or weakness has suddenly become a matter of vital concern to the United States, for we are now fighting shoulder to shoulder with it against an enemy both have profoundly mistrusted for decades. And it is strength, not weakness. Just returned from "down under," I am still stunned by the spectacle of a country which has genuinely gone "all out." Australia's war effort is prodigious.

It has a half-million men in uniform, eager volunteers; 120,000 of them are already overseas, and newspapers carry columns of casualty lists day after day. But the willing man-power of Australia would be of scant use to the empire if its troops, its airmen, and its navy looked to Britain for arms, munitions, and supplies.

They do not. This remote island continent, important

a few years ago mostly for its vast flocks of sheep and its boundless fields of wheat, today is turning out planes, tanks, guns, ships, munitions, and the thousand miscellaneous articles that modern war demands. And these are produced in such quantity that Australia not only arms and supplies its own forces but also furnishes munitions to the British in Singapore, Malaya, India, the Near East, and Egypt. It has even helped supply New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies.

Peak employment in Australian munitions factories during the First World War was 4,000. This time it is 56,000. If persons employed in shipyards, airplane factories, and all the other war industries are reckoned in, 600,000 Australian men and women have war jobs.

Thus of Australia's 7,500,000 population—about

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equal to New York City's, spread incredibly thin over an area as great as the United States—1,100,000 are in the war, in uniform or out of it. That is one adult in every five. Even the city streets show the drain of men, but it is more noticeable in the back country. Hundreds of thousands of sheep went unshorn last year; much wheat could not be harvested or threshed. The men are at grimmer business.

The crowded places are new centers, without names, their location unadvertised. Flying over the lonely land, over hillsides golden with wattle and gorse, you suddenly come upon a sprawling town like those which have mushroomed near our own war plants. Lonely ranches—"stations" is the Australian word—have become vast explosives factories, deep inland to be safe from the guns of coastal raiders. Where sheep stations touched on a deep bay with an almost uninhabited hinterland, now are great shipyards. Twenty munitions towns have sprung up within two years. "It is sheer romance of production," a visiting British official said in wonderment. And this rapid transformation of an agricultural land into an industrial nation has been made possible solely by the foresight and organizing ability of one man, Essington Lewis.

He is Director General of Munitions. Against indifference and even opposition he laid the foundations for Australia's war industry when nobody believed there would be war. Now he directs 600,000 workers who have brought the commonwealth's war output close to the highest peak it can possibly reach considering the limits of its population, available machinery, and supply of raw materials.

Lewis, Australian-born mining engineer, managing director of the great Broken Hill properties (silver and lead mines, steel mills, and shipyards), went on a holiday trip in 1936. That was what he pretended it was. Actually he was uneasy over world events and set out to investigate for himself. He went to Singapore, China, Japan, the Dutch East Indies. After spending two months in Europe he arrived in New York. By that time his vague presentiments of evil had become firm conviction. He invited directors of the Bethlehem Steel Company to dinner and for two hours tried to convince them that Germany was getting ready to start another colossal war. He urged them to prepare for war production. "I am sure they thought that I was a bit cracked," he recalls ruefully.

He had no better success at home. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet were unimpressed, said bluntly they "couldn't start war talk," and in view of the humor the voters were then in, could make no appropriations for defense. Long afterward it developed that the Cabinet had inquired of the British government, in code, about the outlook and was told that Lewis was an alarmist. Lewis tried to start a press campaign; it fell flat.

But after Japan invaded China he got a more thoughtful hearing. In 1938, \$5,000,000 was set aside to lay the groundwork for defense industries. To this Lewis added an undivulged sum of his own money. Attracting as little attention as possible, he directed the building of twenty-seven annexes to various industrial plants, with detailed plans for quick switchover to war production when the emergency should arise.

Seldom has foresight been more completely justified. The twenty-seven annexes quickly produced precision work that no inexperienced plant could turn out. Predictors for anti-aircraft guns, for example. One part that can be held in the palm of the hand is machined in a series of blended curves in three dimensions, and at 800 separate points it must be accurate within one-tenth of an inch. Without these predictors, anti-aircraft guns are useless; given them, it is comparatively easy to turn out the guns.

And so Australia is producing all the anti-aircraft guns it needs; indeed, is exporting them. More than fifty Australian firms are making anti-tank guns. They also made the guns which armed 200 merchant ships.

Speaking of ships, when the war began, Australia had one shipyard; now it has seven, building destroyers, corvettes, small naval craft, and freighters up to 9,000 tons. When I was there fifty corvettes were on the ways.

Behind the ships, of course, is steel. Lewis individually gets the credit for increasing Australia's steel-making capacity from 1,000,000 tons in 1939 to 1,800,000 tons for 1942. In fact, it was he who built Australia's first steel plant, the big Newcastle works, out of profits from Broken Hill mines.

Most spectacular achievement, perhaps, is the creation of an airplane industry. Until midsummer of 1939 Australia had no such thing. Now the country produces all its own training planes, from primary to advanced, and has a surplus to supply other empire pilots. It has just begun to turn out bombers and soon will be producing pursuit ships.

Deep in the center of the state of Victoria a thousand buildings spread over several square miles of what was open farm land a year ago should have begun, by the time this is published, the production of guncotton. The plant cost \$28,000,000 and is to employ 11,000 men and women. Another such plant is being built in Queensland; a third is to be in Tasmania. Four factories which in peace time produced such diverse things as railway cars, illuminating gas, and automobiles are now turning out Bren-gun carriers, armored vehicles which have stood up well in action in North Africa and Syria. They are built with a special bullet-proof steel, the secret of whose manufacture was recently turned over to Britain and America by Lewis's plant at Newcastle.

Australian factories are likewise making a vast range of accessories and necessities—tank periscopes, tele-

scopic gun sights, precision lenses, range finders, pontoon bridges, radio equipment, gas masks, parachutes. If the United States is turning itself into an arsenal for the democracies, Australia has already accomplished the gigantic task of turning itself into an arsenal for Britain's forces in the Far East.

Meanwhile, Britain clamors for beef and mutton, butter and cheese, wheat and wool, leather and canned fruits, which are being shipped in immense quantities. At the time of my visit Australian factories had in two months got orders for 3,000,000 blankets, 7,000,000 pairs of wool socks, 7,200,000 suits of underwear, 3,000,000 pullovers and jackets, 1,000,000 pairs of army boots, and other supplies on the same scale.

These are figures I got from Lewis one cold, rainy day, in his unpretentious Melbourne office. It looks like a real-estate man's office in any American town. Lewis himself—sixty, graying, a little heavy—might pass at a Rotary Club luncheon for a small-town business man. He puts on no side. He has, say the Australians, a way with men and a marvelous acquaintanceship. A notable memory for names and faces springs from his genuine interest in people.

He discussed Australia's war effort earnestly and freely, but his job saddens him. "After 1918 I sincerely hoped I should never live to see another war," he said. "But here we are, and we must get on with it."

He dropped into silences when he seemed to brood upon the baleful past and the uncertain future, while his gaze strayed to the rain-streaked window panes. He broke one of these short silences with a surprising statement: "Whatever happens, we owe a debt of eternal gratitude to the United States," he said. "America has kept nothing back from us. Anything we needed was always given freely and cheerfully—formulas, blueprints, detailed new methods. American aid did not begin with the lend-lease business. It has always been ours for the asking, and we'll never forget."

Correction

In our last issue an error occurred on page 666 in the article entitled "Warning from South America." The correct version is as follows: "Dr. Osvaldo Aranha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, will act together with his colleague, the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Francisco de Campos, totalitarian technician of the Brazilian government. Besides these two officials, delegates to the consultative conference will also meet with General Eurico Dutra, chief of the General Staff of the Army, and with General Goes Monteiro, public apologists of a German victory. Propaganda will be in the hands of Lourival Fontes, Minister of Propaganda, whose methods have always resembled Goebbels's. The guarantees of the delegates will be enforced by the Chief of Police, the Brazilian-born German Nazi, Filinto Mueller."

In the Wind

WHEN IT WAS ANNOUNCED that Japanese submarines were off the coast of California, four members of the state House of Representatives submitted this resolution:

House Resolution No. 37—Relative to asking the Emperor of Japan to defer action for a few weeks—*Whereas*, it is essential that the State Legislature calmly and deliberately consider what action should be taken by the State of California in its part in the present war and what steps be taken to guard the lives and property of citizens of the State of California; now, therefore, be it *Resolved by the Assembly of the State of California*, That we hereby request the Emperor of Japan not to take any action or to do anything drastic until after January 12, 1942, within which time the Legislature may make up its collective mind; and be it further *Resolved*, That we hereby further request the Emperor of Japan not to attempt to emulate in California the action of Germany in going through Holland and Belgium until at least after January 12, 1942.

DIXIANA: Uncle Remus Avenue in Atlanta recently became Lawton Place. "Proponents of the change," said the *Constitution*, "argued that most people thought they lived on a 'Negro street since Uncle Remus was the Negro character of the stories.'" . . . From a pamphlet issued by the Industrial Development Committee, Rockwood, Tennessee: "There is an abundance of common and semi-skilled labor in and around Rockwood. It is made up of the purest Anglo-Saxon population outside of a few well-behaved Negroes, there being no aliens. . . . There is almost unbelievable freedom from violence, radicalism, and unrest."

ALLEN ZOLL, sponsor of several organizations in the Coughlinite front, was in the pay of the Japanese government before the war, according to the New York Coordinating Committee for Democratic Action. The committee has revealed documents now in its possession which outline Zoll's plans for anti-Semitic pro-Japanese propaganda in this country. One letter from Zoll to a high Japanese official reads in part:

Here our activities would be to discredit the opposition to your institution [Japan]. Just as an adroit lawyer wins cases through discrediting the opposition's witnesses, just so can the public mind be influenced by discrediting your attackers. . . . One of the most effective methods . . . is to show that a certain minority group in America, which is very unpopular here, are the ones who are opposed to you. . . . I mentioned this group in our previous conversations but for obvious reasons prefer not to put it in writing.

STATE REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDE BILBO, a relative of the Mississippi Senator, is being sued by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. Bilbo is also personnel director of the Jackson County Woolen Mills, and some of his employees recently knifed and beat two women organizers.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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January 3, 1942

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A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Bureaus on the Move

TEN thousand government employees moving out of Washington make comparatively little noise beside the thunder of the greater thousands moving in to bulge the hotels, the boarding-houses, and any spare beds anywhere. The movement of bureaus attracts little attention beside the movements of armed forces in the middle of a war. Even now, however, the transfer from the capital of a dozen federal agencies to make office space for more thousands of new office workers in war time may be as significant as a battle in shaping the future pattern of government in the United States.

Before the first fear of war Big Government in America had become necessary as bigger and bigger powers grew outside government, sometimes outside the control of any government, national or local. But sometime before the war government seemed to have swallowed the octopus itself. Not only was government big; also, so far as millions of Americans were concerned, it was absentee. It not only possessed new powers, but it sometimes seemed as far from the people as the controls exercised from a real or mythical Wall Street had once seemed to be.

Not even the anti-New Dealers have succeeded in giving the country an adequate conception of the size, measured in people, of the government which has been expanding along the Potomac shore. The expansion did not begin with the New Deal. The government was probably growing when its entire staff of 126 clerks moved with John Adams from Philadelphia to the empty river bottom George Washington had picked for our capital. Economical Calvin never got the number of his clerks in Washington down at all close to the level of those which worked for Woodrow Wilson before the first war. And when Germany invaded Poland, there were more government employees in Washington than were working there when the Armistice ended the First World War, which crowded Washington in its time. Since this war began, according to figures published by the *Washington Post*, something like 70,000 more have been added; and 40,000 more are expected. No wonder space is at a premium. Obviously the President acted wisely in sending peace-time agencies scurrying to other cities. I only hope it is the beginning of a migration—and not only for war time.

Probably nothing less than war could have pried these agencies out of the District of Columbia. A centripetal

force brings more clerks where clerks are, even when the very forces of transportation and communication which have made more government necessary have made a less concentrated government possible. Indeed, even in the midst of war Murray Latimer, head of the Railroad Retirement Board, told a Congressional committee that if his agency were moved to Chicago half its employees would quit. It is on its way there all the same. And others are moving to other big cities, East and West. The rooms these peace-time agencies leave behind will make space for men and women necessary in the war effort. That is the important thing now. But also important is the fact that the moving will mean a crack in the concentration of big government in one place at a distance from millions of the people.

War, of course, is going to mean even bigger government, and government able to act quickly everywhere. Total war must bring a total country under one command. What that will mean, beyond war, is anybody's guess. It will certainly not mean less federal power. Even greater, then, in a victorious democracy, will be the necessity of getting government closer to the people than it can possibly be in one dropsical district a few miles from one coast of a continental country.

Of course, Chicago is no more American than Washington. Philadelphia and St. Louis are no closer to some parts of the United States than Washington is. But in their variety and separateness they are places where the governed predominate, and not the governors and their clerks. No one of them would be better than Washington, but the division of great government in cities across the whole land might help in the so far insoluble problem of bringing the government into closer contact with the people themselves—where they are, in shops and on farms, in cities and villages, on the roads. If the war does that, if it brings the peace-time functions of big government closer to the sprawling country, we can count it one gain. We can look forward to a democracy of great powers which governs in terms of people and not of statistics and reports—reports which now make it necessary to employ more people to keep our archives than the whole company of office-holders who first came to Washington to help make our history.

In bigness may be a power necessary to us now and in the future. But democracy must somehow find and keep closeness to the people, and not merely concentrated power far above them, far from them, all in one complex and overwhelming place.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Salvation by Semantics

LANGUAGE IN ACTION: A GUIDE TO ACCURATE THINKING. By S. I. Hayakawa. Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$2.

ACCORDING to the author this book has been inspired by Korzybski's system of general semantics. It reads like a popularization of Stuart Chase's "The Tyranny of Words." Were it presented as a textbook in rhetoric on the high-school level, its naive and crude approach to the problems of language might be held excusable on pedagogical grounds. But it is offered to all and sundry as the wisdom "of the twentieth century's newest science, semantics," as an indispensable safeguard against superstition, propaganda, and inaccurate thinking. And like everything else on the market today, stress is placed on its important but rather vague implications for democracy. There is reason to believe that the claims of the author and publisher will find wide acceptance among the fad-hungry reading public.

"Citizens of a modern society," writes Mr. Hayakawa, "need to be scientifically aware of the mechanisms of interpretation if they are to guard themselves against being driven mad by the welter of words with which they are now faced." By "mad" the author means, quite literally, insane. Failure to achieve semantic health causes not only insanity but a whole series of evils, from unemployment to marital incompatibility. Like his master, Korzybski, but not in so extreme a form, Mr. Hayakawa fails to distinguish between two very different sorts of things: linguistic confusions which may be eliminated by analysis, thus clearing the way for a fruitful approach to problems, and the causes of problems and their solutions, which are outside the scope of semantics. The notion that bad linguistic habits are at the root of our social evils and that good linguistic habits will abolish them is just as much a form of belief in verbal magic as the primitive's faith that his enemy can be slain by an incantation.

Running through the entire book is a series of fundamental confusions. There is the confusion expressed in the statement that "no word ever has exactly the same meaning twice." This is obviously false. Consider, for example, any two sentences like these about the number series: "One is less than two"; "Two is less than three." The words "two" and "less than" have exactly the same meaning in both sentences. Hayakawa, like Korzybski, systematically confuses things, no two of which are exactly the same, with relations, into which different things may enter. As things, twenty copper pennies are different from two silver dimes. But their currency value is exactly the same. As things, every copper piece differs from every other; but as pennies their value is identical.

There is a whole cluster of confusions about "two-valued orientation." This is the belief, according to the author, that every question has only two sides. Not satisfied with pointing out that the belief is not always true, he suggests that it is never true except for purposes of conflict. "The two-valued orientation produces [!] the combative spirit, *but nothing else.*" The language of everyday life, in contradistinction,

shows only "multiple-valued" orientation, while that of science is "infinite-valued." This is the sheerest poppycock. The language of both everyday life and science recognizes that many questions allow only two mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: for example, Shall I get married or not? Is any trace of arsenic observable or not?

There is the confusion about "intensional orientation." This concerns itself with the meanings or connotations of terms as contrasted with "extensional orientation," which takes account of the facts or "realities" noted. The first approach leads to day-dreaming, circular thinking, sometimes to insanity. Only the second is scientific. Mr. Hayakawa forgets that before we can go to the facts we must be able to deduce something from the connotation of our hypothesis about the facts. There is no recognition on his part of the role of logical implications in making explicit what we must expect to observe about facts when we entertain a hypothesis. The experiment or its reading is the end term of a process of which the manipulation of symbols, according to certain rules of inference, is an integral part. A "fact" doesn't prove or establish anything unless it confirms or refutes a prediction that *validly* follows from the connotation of the hypothesis. Despite its subtitle, this book tells us nothing about the criteria of accurate thinking. It doesn't even distinguish between logical validity and material truth.

Finally, there is the confusion on which the book culminates. The reader is asked to paste in his hat at least one basic and general rule which is a sure-fire guide for proper "extensional" orientation. The rule is: "COW₁ is not COW₂, COW₂ is not COW₃, . . ." The word "cow" (for which any term can be substituted) tells us what this cow has in common with other cows. The index number reminds us that this one is *different*. If only we can remember this, we will never identify an abstraction with a thing. Something, however, must be wrong with the rule. For if we apply Mr. Hayakawa's previous rule to it—namely, "no word ever has exactly the same meaning twice"—there must be more than three cows here, since COW₂ is not COW₂. But we may let this pass; since, according to this school, consistency is important only as a symptom or cause of mental disorder. What is glaring about the error of Messrs. Korzybski and Hayakawa in this connection is their failure to observe that if, in a specific context, my attitude to cows is actually and justifiably based upon what they all have in common, the index number of any particular cow is irrelevant. In science as in common sense, it is sometimes just as important to grasp identities as differences.

The semantical rule about cows is soberly recommended for use whenever signs of mental disorder are apparent. Here is a typical situation, word for word as given by the author, in which the rule is invoked. "'I love her. . . I love her. . . Oh, if I could only forget that she is a waitress! . . . What will my friends think if I marry a waitress? . . . But I love her. . . If only she weren't a waitress.' But waitress, is not waitress₂." There are other passages like this in the book.

SIDNEY HOOK

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General de Gaulle

CHARLES DE GAULLE. By Philippe Barrès. Doubleday, Doran and Company. \$2.

THE legend is already full grown in Africa that there once was a French corporal, a giant called De Gaulle, long dead and in his grave. One day the boots of another corporal, an upstart named Hitler in a tin-pot helmet, defiled the streets of Paris. Out leaped De Gaulle from his tomb and roared in fury, "I'm a general now and I'll show you something!"

Charles de Gaulle might just as well have been buried during the years when fools and traitors were digging a sepulcher for France. He put it all down, in books and General Staff memoranda—that the next war was going to roll on caterpillar treads, that the Maginot Line stopped where France's peril began, that the Nazis would pour over Belgium, divide, and conquer. He even named the exact gates of invasion, each town and river valley.

Nobody listened—except the Germans. De Gaulle invented the Germany army. It was von Ribbentrop and Hühnlein, of the *Kraftwagen Korps*, who gave M. Barrès his first tip on Guderian's "great French colleague, your specialist in mechanization." Pétain picked De Gaulle as aide-de-camp; Weygand cited him as "remarkable, bold, resourceful": but the brass hats went into battle thumbing the rules of 1914. Even Reynaud rejected his advice to withdraw to Brittany from Tours, to North Africa from Bordeaux.

Well, De Gaulle is really "a general now," and certainly showing Berlin and Vichy "something." This book, by the one-time chief editor of *Le Matin* and foreign editor of *Paris-Soir*, is badly needed. The Free French leader has no ball-of-fire personality. American newsreel audiences see more of the nose and the man's excessive, nearly freakish height than of his inner genius. The Dakar fiasco, over which M. Barrès drops a cautious curtain of "unpublishable military secrets," and the General's brash offer of African bases to Washington, which landed him in Churchill's doghouse for weeks, have encouraged the notion that De Gaulle is just another skull-bound soldier.

The author, who watched the débâcle as a captain at the Gamelin-Weygand G. H. Q. and has no illusions about frenzied futility among high commanders, sets things right. He quotes page after page of De Gaulle's writings and speeches—some of the clearest prose in modern military literature—and you see for yourself that the General was always right: not only in his warnings, but in his white-hot decisions as well; in his defiance of Vichy; in the restraint of his sorrow for the lost French fleet at Oran; in his scorn for Pétain's armistice: "We didn't need you, Marshal, to obtain such conditions of slavery. We didn't need the Conqueror of Verdun. Anybody would have done as well."

Commander at Laon and Abbeville—the only two engagements of the Battle of France which the Germans lost—De Gaulle proved how the tanks he had pleaded for six years earlier might have rewritten history. And from defeat he restored, in modest but symbolically vital measure, an army, a navy, an empire to his ally—and hope to his fatherland.

Is De Gaulle enough of a liberal and a democrat? Prob-

ably not. He is certainly a nationalist, of the type which has always regarded only dead Germans as good ones and had much to do with making Hitler possible. In the best of worlds we should like to have De Gaulle different. But the point is that Free France is at war. De Gaulle's officers and men, like all Frenchmen that have ever been or are yet to come, are divided in their philosophies. The one thing which unites them is their religion of France. Even if he were as progressive as could be wished, the General would have to stand on neutral ground politically to hold his troops' allegiance. After all, it is they who are fighting and dying. Roosevelt has accepted Churchill; Churchill, Beaverbrook; and Beaverbrook, Stalin. As De Gaulle himself told M. Barrès: "Some say I am in league with the Communists; others that I want to establish a monarchy, imperialism, or personal dictatorship. All these are forgetting one fact: France has been invaded. I am not a politician. I am a simple patriot who wants to liberate France." And he added the pledge that when the victory is won, "France herself through her popular assemblies, freely chosen, will decide the form of her government."

Hitler stands between the author and the sources necessary to a complete portrait. M. Barrès has produced less a biography than a chronicle of crisis and rededication. It tells a new story of the Republic's last days; how Churchill, at the final desperate conference, had "tears in his eyes"; how an officer barred the De Portes woman from Reynaud's door: "No, madame. If France must die, she will die decently." It salutes the Free French troops in Britain, in Africa, in Asia, and the Free French troops at home—the men, the women, the children, praying behind locked doors to the Cross of Lorraine.

M. Barrès, it must regretfully be added, has been betrayed by his translator and editor. Slovenly is the word for the English version. Gallicisms run riot in a translation monumental for its ineptitude. The rightist "Xaxier" (Xavier) Vallat, Spanish Ambassador "Leguerica" (Lequerica), the Nazi purge of "June 13" (30), 1934, are a few of the type-setting blunders. The stylistic inconsistencies, the tendency of "de" in the General's name to hop from lower to upper case, the weird misuse of italics, subheads, and footnotes, would horrify the proofreader of the humblest country weekly. Poor M. Barrès is a prime candidate for a Society of Mistreated Foreign Authors.

HAL LEHRMAN

Henry Miller, Revivalist

THE COLOSSUS OF MAROUSSI. By Henry Miller. The Colt Press. \$3.50.

SOMEWHERE in the wilderness of contemporary American letters there is a man strolling around in a sheepskin with a notice-board that reads: "Don't look now but I'm pursuing God." I may have seen the notice slightly sideways and the last word may have two o's, but in the long run it's much the same thing. The point is that when Miller issues a book he uses his typewriter as a kind of papal throne from which to promulgate *ex cathedra* pronouncements; and to subject these pronouncements to the literary examination rather than the religious examination is silly. Miller does not write books; he makes acts of confession via the dictionary.

And the difference between his confessions and those of a dozen intelligent and tasteful individuals who also make confessions is that Henry Miller really has something to confess. Personally I find the spectacle of Miller flying off the transcendental handle at once tremendously exhilarating and incompletely comprehensible. I have the same sensation when I go, or rather, if I go to revivalist congregations. It whips up my optimism and I wonder why.

There are several categories of the mystic: Aldous Huxley, for instance, belongs to the aristocratic category that receives its revelations via historical interpretations; he is an academic mystic. Then there is the category of the inspired artisan such as John Bunyan or Henry Miller or D. H. Lawrence; and then there is the category of the natural saint such as Rilke. The characteristic of the inspired artisan, as I see it, is that he has no time for the academic mystic or the natural saint. Miller finds intolerable all those spiritual camels that have been taken through the eyes of needles by established grace. He has a camel of his own, and his books record the efforts he has made to take it through the eye of his intellect. I say all this because to me Miller is one of the few writers of the time who really preach toleration, which I take to be the negative aspect of love; but his own practice of toleration stops short when it comes up against any one of half a dozen *bêtes noires*. These include poetry, established grace, "effeminate young men from Oxford or Cambridge," Civilization, the English, decadence, etc.

For at heart the inspired artisan is simply the militant Protestant. Miller, for instance, embraces passionately the heresy that at the pinch all men are nice and good and capable of happiness. Therefore established authority is unnecessary and, what is more, immoral. This conviction leads to the most beautifully spurious bohemianism of belief, in which the individual venerates a phenomenon known officially as the Inner Light. I seem to remember someone saying that the characteristic of the Inner Light is that it leads you astray. It brings about the intolerable arrogance of minor messiahs, the private telephone conversations of hot-gospellers with God Almighty, the anarchy of minorities doing their damndest to become majorities, and the suspicion among artists that each one of them is God. To this heresy Miller is St. John the Baptist, preaching in the deserts of Paris and London and New York that happiness is possible. He commits the magnificent crime of being an optimist. I only hope that when his optimism begins to bleed at the center, he will find something, somewhere, with which to staunch it.

Technically this book would go into the case marked Travel, but in fact it should be entered as a supplement to Miller's preceding books, and these go in the highly suspect corner marked Mysticism. Miller is not a writer any more than Pope Pius is a poet; he uses words because, as is said in Sweeney Agonistes, "I gotta use words when I talk to you." Miller's rather too deliberate exhibitions of illiteracy (he refers to The Phoenix and the Turtle as "one of the most mysterious sonnets Shakespeare wrote" and remarks, "My book knowledge is nil") seem to be intended to impress upon us his unconcern about his medium, but anyone who can make up titles as good as this particular title knows more about words than an illiterate. But he exploits only one aspect of the business, and this is the aspect where the writer adopts

the toga and the histrionic pose to make melodramatic condemnations or felicitations all in prose, where the noun is abstract and the verb exaggeratedly violent. For example:

During all the years that I have been writing I have steeled myself to the idea that I would not really be accepted, at least by my own countrymen, until after my death.

Or:

For Durrell and myself reality lay wholly beyond the reach of their puny instruments, which in themselves were nothing more than clumsy reflections of their circumscribed imaginations locked forever in the hypothetical prison of logic. [This is about astronomers.]

But then for me Henry Miller is not a writer; he is a man going around with a notice-board about God.

GEORGE BARKER

War Leaders of the Confederacy

CONFLICT: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. By George Fort Milton. Coward-McCann. \$3.50.

THE South has long needed a book by one of its own people that would show clearly how blindly the arrogant slave-holding aristocrats plunged the whole section into the suicidal folly of the Civil War, and how completely foreign that war was to the interests of all the people except a few thousand at the top of the social heap. George Fort Milton is a man who could write such a book, and in some of his earlier work, notably "The Eve of Conflict," he was within striking distance of the goal. This new book, however, rather veers off in a different direction. Although Mr. Milton is realistic and even critical in his attitude toward Southern leaders, including Lee, the tone of the book is pretty much on the conventional side.

The author lays considerable emphasis on the theory that the South, with better leadership, on several occasions might have won the war. For example, better use might have been made of Joseph E. Johnston. It is true that Jefferson Davis's lack of confidence in Johnston hampered the latter's work in the field, and even deprived him of command at important junctures of the war, but Johnston was reticent to the point of rudeness, and a better man than Jefferson Davis would have been hard put to get along with him. Again, Mr. Milton suggests that Lee was in error when he invaded the North in the campaign that ended in Gettysburg. Longstreet wanted to use a small force to contain the federal Army of Virginia, which had been battered at Chancellorsville, and move the bulk of Lee's army to the West. It seems plain now that Longstreet's plan was much better than Lee's. Moreover, the Confederate troops were badly handled at Gettysburg, whether the fault lay with Lee or with Longstreet. But even if the North had been defeated in the West, or at Gettysburg, it would probably have raised new armies and continued the war to victory.

Mr. Milton's exploration of all the military might-have-beens makes an absorbing story, and his one-volume account of four years of war will keep the reader interested all the way, even if it does not add much to our perspective of the Civil War.

CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ

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The Movies

THE year 1941 will, let us hope, be remembered as one of the worst in the history of the motion-picture industry. The public, on the verge of war, has apparently been unable to make up its mind what it wanted in the way of entertainment, and the industry has reflected this indecision by remaking old films, some of which should never have been made in the first place, and relying on the tritest of film formulas for the rest of its output. There have, of course, been several notable exceptions; "Citizen Kane," "Philadelphia Story," "How Green Was My Valley," and "The Lady Eve" here, each in its way, first-rate pictures. On the other hand, it is doubtful if any other year has seen such a batch of major horrors—in fact, there should really be a special set of academy awards; for mawkish sentimentality, "Blossoms in the Dust"; for phony social realism, "Tobacco Road"; for whimsy, "My Life with Caroline"; for bad taste, "Honky Tonk"; and for sheer nonsense, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde."

The holiday films are just about what one would expect from the year's record. The most pretentious offering is "H. M. Pulham, Esq.," adapted from J. P. Marquand's novel. The chief quality of the book was a gentle but caustic irony which has emerged on the screen as rather heavy-handed humor; moreover, the picture doesn't seem to be about Boston more than any other city, and as everyone knows Boston is what Mr. Marquand writes about. Hedy Lamarr, through some strange quirk of the casting director, plays a brisk American business girl; an occasional ripple of motion plays over those statuesquely beautiful features, and everyone will be pleased to hear that she is getting on very well with her English.

"The Shanghai Gesture" was in its original form a somewhat daring melodrama with a good deal of gusto, but the film version has had to make such vast concessions to the Hays office that nothing much remains but silly dialogue and unintelligible situations. Mother Goddam has become Mother Gin Sling, and her establishment is now devoted to gambling; Sir Guy Charteris, the wicked Englishman, has also been cleaned up in the interests of Anglo-American solidarity, and his daughter is only permitted to drink and hiccup her way to doom. Josef von Sternberg, who directed the picture, has used a technique reminiscent of barnstorming days, and Gene Tierney contributes a performance which adds up to make this probably the worst, and unconsciously the funniest, picture of the year.

"How does a girl of your obvious background and culture happen to live in this strange jungle paradise?" (or something to that effect) asks the aging Professor of Maureen O'Sullivan in "Tarzan's Secret Treasure." Miss O'Sullivan's answer may satisfy the professor but certainly not the audience. However, Johnny Weismuller is as good a Tarzan as ever, and masses of crocodiles, elephants, monkeys, and natives on the warpath fill the screen. Children as well as adults in attendance will probably enjoy this.

The best picture showing at the moment is a Russian film, "The Girl from Leningrad," which up to a few months ago could not have been shown in this country. The action takes place during the Russo-Finnish War and tells a simple story

of a nurse who goes to the front, thinks her fiancé is dead, is wounded, herself, recovers, and finds he is not dead after all—certainly not much of a plot. What makes the picture so moving is the simplicity, humor, and lack of bravado with which it is treated; moreover, it is free from the self-consciousness which pervades most Russian films made for foreign consumption, and in addition it should correct the impression that Russian women are homely, for in this case the star is a girl of great charm and appeal.

Also on Broadway at the moment are "Hellzapoppin'" and "Remember the Day." For those who can stand a good deal of noise the first may be enjoyable; the second is strictly for the very sentimental, being concerned with the unhappy reminiscences of a schoolteacher whose lover was killed in the last war. Miss Colbert gives a nice performance, but even that doesn't make up for the fact that the film isn't exactly happy Christmas fare.

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MUSIC

A YEAR ago, rejoicing over the coming of Virgil Thomson to the New York *Herald Tribune*, I said that I expected to be irritated by his perversity as often as delighted by his penetration. Today I can speak not of expectation but of fact—of the writing Mr. Thomson has done, some of which has been wonderful and some terrible. Discussing Large Questions like a five-year plan for the New York Philharmonic, or mere pet ideas like the wow technique of Toscanini, Mr. Thomson has occasionally been terrible; but about pieces of music and performances he

has often been wonderful. And one example is good and important enough to quote from here.

"Dimitri Mitropoulos has taken over the Philharmonic-Symphony concerts like an occupying army," he began the other day. "To the outward ear all is discipline, machine finish, tension, and power. To the inner one that listens less to music than for it, there were slim pickings yesterday afternoon." One of the works performed by Mitropoulos was David Diamond's Symphony No. 1; and speaking correctly of Diamond's "constant employment of hubbub as a substitute for interesting complexity," and later of the absence in the music of "American ways and means" except "a substratum . . . of steady short-beat rhythm that, if it isn't wholly of this hemisphere, is certainly local in its origins," Mr. Thomson went on to say: "Mr. Mitropoulos seemed to misunderstand this rhythmic substratum, to take it as the deliberate effort on Mr. Diamond's part to depict nervousness. Now David Diamond has a healthy, though not always interesting, musical mind. His thought is often imprecise and quite regularly self-indulgent. But jittery it certainly is not. Jittery and musically unsure are what I suspect Mr. Mitropoulos of being, underneath all the panoply of his technical command. He makes every piece I have ever heard him conduct sound nervous and violent"; and summed this up with a reference to Mitropoulos's "Panzer division tactics."

This review is important because it was only after Mr. Thomson had spoken out about Barbirolli last year that some of his colleagues spoke too; and only under this pressure that the Philharmonic-Symphony directors acted—but then only to be ready to capitulate to the Mitropoulos blitz tactics. Now that Mr. Thomson has said his say on Mitropoulos some of his colleagues may follow his lead again; the directors may follow the lead of the press; and we may be saved from Mitropoulos as chief conductor of the Philharmonic-Symphony.

More and more I prefer to listen to music at home from records and broadcasts. They don't give me the sound of a great orchestra playing under a great conductor in Carnegie Hall; but on the infrequent occasions when a great orchestra and conductor are in Carnegie Hall—when, for example, Beecham conducts the Philadelphia Orchestra in superb performances of Haydn and Mozart—I can go, and do. And on other occasions listening at home offers priceless

advantages: I was, for example, able to shut off the radio when I had heard as much as I cared to hear of the Diamond Symphony; whereas at a concert of the National Orchestral Association I had to endure William Schuman's Cantata "This Is Our Time" to the end. And even at the Beecham-Philadelphia Orchestra concert I had to sit through all of Virgil Thomson's Symphony No. 2, when at home I would have stopped after one movement. As a composer too Mr. Thomson can be very good and very bad; and as a composer too he is, apparently, bad when he is concerned with pet ideas—in this symphony his pet hates of "the static rhetorical symmetry of thematic returns and recapitulations" that "depersonalize the expression," and other "structural continuity devices" of classical sonata form that distract listeners' attention "from whatever direct and personal communication the music may have to offer them." But it is my impression that all these devices were part of an ordered use of the medium for the purpose of ordered "direct and personal communication"; and while a composer who doesn't like these particular devices may use any others that suit him better, the principle of free association which Mr. Thomson seems to have used made incoherent a "personal communication" that impressed me as inconsequential.

B. H. HAGGIN

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THE NATION, 55 Fifth Ave., New York. Price 15 cents a copy. By subscription—Domestic: One year \$5; Two years \$8; Three years \$11. Additional Postage per year: Foreign, \$1; Canadian, \$1. The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs Information Service, Dramatic Index. Two weeks' notice and the old address as well as the new are required for change of address.

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